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D.: Mines and Minerals--Natural Gas Not Included in Conveyance of "Mi

CASE COMMENTS
MINES AND Mn mALS-NATuRAL GAs NOT INCLUDED IN CON-

OF "MNEpALs."-D was the lessee from one who claimed
ownership of the natural gas under a deed which granted and
conveyed to his predecessors in title "all the coal, coal oil, fire clay
and other minerals of every kind and character" under the described tract of land. The deed conveyed to the grantee the right
to enter and remove the coal and other minerals of every kind and
character, and the right to erect all necessary structures incident
to this removal. P claims under a lease from a claimant who
derived title through the severance-grantors. P drilled six gas wells,
and in this case sought an injunction to prohibit D from completing
the drilling of a well which D had commenced. Held, in granting
the injunction, that a conveyance of all coal and other minerals of
every kind and character under a tract of land in Pennsylvania did
not include natural gas. New York State NaturalGas Corp. v. SwanFinch Gas Dev. Corp., 178 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
VEYAucE

Whether petroleum oil and natural gas are included in a convoyance or a reservation of "minerals" has troubled the courts since
the turn of the century. Prior to that time, since oil and gas had
little value, courts were prone to hold that the parties did not
intend to include oil and gas in a conveyance or reservation of
minerals. See, Stegall v. Bugh, 310 S.W.2d 251 (Ark. 1958). While
a vast: majority of the courts have since changed and modified this
rule because the parties in recent years have intended to include
gas and oil in the term "minerals," Pennsylvania has chosen to follow their rule that oil and gas are not minerals. The United States
district court in the principal case decided the issue on the basis of
controlling Pennsylvania law.
The first Pennsylvania case on this subject held that a reservation in a deed of "all minerals" did not include petroleum oil.
Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 86 (1882). Another early case
establishing this law was Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 Atl. 832
(1906), where it was held that even though natural gas is a mineral
in a scientific sense, in the absence of any intention to the contrary
a reservation of "the mineral underlying" land does not include
natural gas. This rule requiring clear and convincing evidence to
show that gas is intended to be included in the term "minerals"
still prevails in Pennsylvania, as evidenced by the principal case,
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and the earlier case of Bundy v. Myers, 372 Pa. 583, 94 A.2d 724
(1958), where a reservation of "the oil, coal, fire clay and minerals
of every kind and character," was held not to include natural gas.
While Pennsylvania has followed its older cases on this subject,
the weight of authority is that in a conveyance or reservation of
minerals, "there is no question that minerals include oil and gas."
Crain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F.2d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 1928). Accord,
Poe v. Ulrey, 283 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908); Warren v. Clinchfield
Coal Corp., 166 Va. 524, 186 S.E. 20 (1936). This seems to be the
more reasonable view, for even the Pennsylvania court admits that
the layman and the scientist include these elements in the definition of minerals. Silver v. Bush, supra.
A problem of interpretation often arises when certain minerals
are specifically listed and either preceded or followed by the more
general term "minerals." In such a case, the intent of the parties
to the instrument should govern. Thus, in a conveyance excluding
"minerals and oil," the word "mineral" included gas as well as oil.
The mere fact that a particular mineral had not been discovered
or was unknown at the time of the conveyance does not alter the
rule. Maynard v. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642, 113 S.W.2d 13 (1938). On
the other hand, Stegall v. Bugh, supra, held that the accepted legal
and commercial usage at the time of the conveyance should govern
the interpretation of the language of the deed. Thus "mineral"
did not include oil and gas in 1900, as the latter were not discovered in the area until twenty years later.
The majority view that the term "minerals" includes oil and
gas finds support in two cases with granting clauses similar to the
one in the principal case. Gibson v. Sellars, 252 S.W.2d 911 (Ky.
1952), held that a deed containing a reservation or exception of
"coal and minerals" includes also the oil and gas underlying the
land. The word "coal" is merely added for description, and consequently does not qualify the word "mineral." Accord, Lase v.
Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). Even when there
is a conveyance to a coal company of "all coal and minerals of
every description in, upon, or underlying land," it has been held
to include all oil and gas, if any. Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp.,
supra.
The West Virginia court has rationally approached the problem by holding that the word "mineral," as used in deeds, does
not have an absolute legal definition. While it may be limited by
the doctrine of ejusdem generis, it prima facie includes oil and
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natural gas, and will not be restricted unless the context of the
deed clearly shows an intention to that effect. Prindle v. Baker,
116 W. Va. 48, 178 S.E. 513 (1935). In interpreting the West Virginia law on this subject, the circuit court of appeals stated in
Dingess v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 271 Fed. 864, 866 (4th
Cir. 1921), that "such is to be ascertained from the language of
the deed, the relative position of the parties, and the nature of
the transaction." Thus a conveyance of "all the minerals, mineral
substances, and oils of every sort and description" was held to
include natural gas.
West Virginia has logically followed this reasoning by holding that an exception or reservation of "all mineral, coal, iron etc."
included oil and gas. The other words do not qualify or restrict
the word "mineral," and the doctrine of ejusdem generis is not
applicable. Norman v. Lewis, 100 W. Va. 429, 130 S.E. 913
(1925). A provision in a deed "excepting and reserving from this
grant all the coal iron and minerals," with a recitation that no
conveyance thereof was intended, and with no limitation or qualification by other language, excepted from the conveyance all oil
and natural gas in the land. Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624,
191 S.E. 360 (1937). The court also stated that where the deed
is ambiguous, the court will not be bound by the general rule that
in the absence of any limitation or qualification as to intention by
any other clause of the deed, the word "minerals" includes oil and
gas as well as solid minerals. However, the doctrine of ejusdem
generi, will not be invoked where the language is clear and
unambiguous as to intent.
One West Virginia case, Horse Creek Land & Mining Co. v.
Midkilf, 81 W. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918), seems to be at first
glance clearly contra to other cases in this state. There it was held
that an exception and reservation of "all the minerals, coals," with
rights of ingress and egress was not a reservation of oil and gas.
It was thought that the word "coals" qualified the word "minerals."
The use of the word "the" before minerals seems to be the sole
distinguishing factor of this case as compared with the cases discussed above. While this is admittedly a very slight distinction, the
intention of the parties was also considered.
In comparison, a Virginia case held that a conveyance of land
excepting "all the metals and minerals of every kind and character,"
did not except limestone. The theory was that since the land was
located in limestone territory, and the parties knew that it could
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not be removed without destroying the surface, they would have
specifically mentioned limestone had they intended to convey it.
Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1929). In viewing this
case, at least one noted authority has stated that by a similar
process of reasoning, "strip" coal is not a mineral. Indeed, there
are indications that the West Virginia court may so hold. DoN=,
CoAL, Orr & GAS IN WsT ViRGmA AND VmGINIA §§ 80-33 (1951).
In conclusion, West Virginia has tended to follow the majority
and better view that petroleum oil and natural gas are included
in the term "minerals" as used in a conveyance or exception in a
deed, unless a contrary intent is clearly shown. Under this view
the principal case, which states the applicable and recognized law of
Pennsylvania, is contra to this theory and is definitely the minority
holding. In the writer's opinion, this case would therefore be
followed by very few courts today.
F. L. D., Jr.
ESTATE AND G=rr TAx-GtRTrrous CoNVEYANCE IN FEE SimoENTON
OF ENjoYMENT BY GRANroR FOR Lw-.-Decedent gratuitously executed general warranty deeds to his children
for income-producing real estate. The deeds did not recite any
reservation of interest in either the realty or rents; however, decedent entered into oral agreements with his grantees under which
he was entitled to, and actually did receive, all rents until he died.
The Tax Court of the United States upheld the commissioner's
inclusion of the realty in decedent's estate. Held, that the retention
of the right to the rents, even though disassociated from the instruments of conveyance, did not preclude the application of the retention-of-enjoyment meaning of the statute (Int. Rev. Code of 1954
§ 2036) if decedent in fact did so enjoy the property during his
life. Thus, the value of the premises was properly included in
decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. McNichol
v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
PLE-OPAL R

The element maling this case worthy of attention was not the
gratuity of the transaction, but the oral retention of the enjoyment
of the property for life. It is true that the absence of any consideration prevented the transfer from being a bona fide sale, but it
is equally true that the presence of nominal consideration would
not have been "adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth" and thus the transfer would still not have been eligible for

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss1/5

4

